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ABSTRACT
Originally conceived and funded as a research project, the Internet has grown into a
commercial, global and integrated service network. This has changed the nature of
traffic on the Internet with the increasing use of things like video conferencing and time
critical transactions. These forms of Internet usage place high demands on bandwidth.
Added to this is the fact that the number of users is increasing at a dramatic rate and
shows no signs of slowing. This is leading to a 'tragedy of the commons' where endemic
congestion will reduce the value of the Internet to everyone. It also implies the
introduction of some form of quality of service (QoS) to differentiate time critical traffic
from less time critical traffic.

Pricing usage has been shown to be effective in controlling congestion by promoting
more effective resource allocation. To provide the necessary QoS, there is an argument
that simply increasing the available bandwidth will achieve this, while at the same time
maintaining the simple model of the current Internet. However, there is also an
argument that a more complex model may be needed that provides various levels of
QoS with an associated pricing scheme to manage usage of these levels of QoS. A
major part of the debate on this subject surrounds the trade-off between efficiency,
economics and complexity that exists in introducing QoS and pricing to the Internet.
This document discusses some of these issues, presents some of the current proposals
for pricing Internet usage and finally compares the presented pricing proposals.
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1 . Introduction

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The Internet is a network of networks that uses packet-switching communications
technology based on the Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). In
this scheme, no open connection is maintained during a communication session as in the
circuit-switched technology used in telephony. Instead, all users share a common
communications medium that uses 'statistical multiplexing' to facilitate this sharing. The
stream of data to be sent is broken up into pieces called 'packets' which are sent on to
the network. When one computer is not sending a packet other computers can use the
line to send packets. The breaking up of the data into packets and the reassembley on
arrival is handled by the TCP. IP provides the addressing needed by computers on the
Internet (routers) to forward the packets to the next link on their journey to the
destination.

This 'packetisation' allows for efficient use of the communications medium. Take the
case of an interactive terminal session to a remote computer. The majority of the time
the user is thinking and the network is only needed when they strike a key. When this
happens the data is encapsulated in a packet and sent across the network. Maintaining a
connection the whole time would be wasteful and would stop other users using the
communication line.

As there is no connection maintained during communication, the Internet is referred to
as 'connectionless'. Each packet is routed independently to its destination and it is
possible for packets belonging to one message to take different routes and arrive out of
order. When a packet is received by a router, it examines the destination address in the
IP header and passes it to the next router, which is chosen according to a routing
algorithm. The routing is dynamically calculated to provide the best route to the next

--
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hop, this means it is possible for packets to take different routes and arrive in a different
order. This provides a very good failure recovery mechanism; if a node on the route
fails, the routing information will be updated and the packets will be able to take a
different route. TCP ensures that on arrival the packets are reassembled in the correct
order and that none are missing, and IP ensures that packets reach the correct
destination.

The network makes no commitments about how long a packet will take to be delivered,
or even if it will be delivered at all. In other words it is a 'best effort' service. These
delays and lost packets can occur during times of congestion. If the arrival rate of
packets at a switch (router) is greater than the outgoing rate, queues of packets build up
in the switch. These queues can cause packet delays, and if buffer space runs out,
packets will be dropped. There is also a time-to-live value in the IP header that, when
exceeded, will also cause the packet to be dropped.

In addition to the delay and dropping response of routers, TCP has mechanisms that are
sensitive to congestion. These mechanisms are described by Clark and Fang (1998, p.
366), but simply put, when TCP detects that a packet has been lost, through not
receiving an acknowledgement, it slows down its rate of transmission (or 'backs off)
and then resends the lost packet. When packets are not being lost, TCP will increase its
transfer rate to try to fill the network links fully.

This simple 'connectionless', 'best-effort' architecture has been very successful to date.
However, there are current moves to extend this architecture in two ways. The first is
the introduction of multicasting. At present, when a sender wants to send a packet to
multiple receivers, the packet must be duplicated once for every receiver. This is not an
efficient use of resources. Multicasting will allow the source to send the packet only
once, and it will be replicated by the network only when necessary, that is when the

I. Introduction

3

transmission paths diverge. The packet's destination address, then, becomes the
multicast group address, which doesn't convey information about the receiver's location
as it is a logical address. Receivers wishing to become part of a multicast send a 'join'
message to the nearest router. The routing algorithm then creates distribution trees that
connect every source to every receiver. An important characteristic to this discussion is
that in multicasting the sender is not aware of who is receiving the packets.

The second proposed extension to the Internet architecture is the introduction of
different Qualities of Service (QoS). This is because the current best-effort service may
not be able to support some of the future video and voice applications. Also, providing
the same level of service to all applications may not be an efficient use of bandwidth;
providing differential QoS may allow scarce resources to be devoted to the applications
that are the most performance sensitive. This has implications on pricing the Internet as
Shenker, Clark, Estrin and Herzog ( 1 996, p. 200) point out "Offering multiple qualities
of service requires some form of incentives, such as pricing, to encourage the
appropriate use of the service classes". However, the introduction of levels of QoS is
not a foregone conclusion and there is strong debate on the subject.

Due to the changing nature and rapid growth in Internet use there is increasing
congestion and a case can be made for introducing some form of resource management.
Usage-based pricing has been proposed as an effective way to achieve more effective
management. However, there is much debate on how usage-based pricing should be
implemented, or whether it should be implemented at all. Included in this debate are the
issues of how to handle differential QoS and multicasting, which both add complexity to
any usage-based pricing solution. Many of these issues remain unresolved. This
document discusses some of those issues and describes some of the possible usage
based pricing solutions put forward by various researchers.
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1.2 Research Questions
•

What are the contemporary issues surrounding resource usage management on the
Internet?

•

How does usage-based pricing relate to resource usage management on the Internet?

•

What are the advantages and disadvantages of current pricing proposals for Internet
usage?

---
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2. THE CASE FOR USAGE-BASED PRICING

2.1 The Expanding Internet
The use of the Internet in general is increasing at a rapid rate as a 1998 study by Daley
( cited in IRM, 1998, p. 1) shows:

1. Internet traffic is doubling every 100 days.
2. Between 1993 and 1997, the number of Internet users rose from 3 million to over
100 million.
3. Just 4 years after the Internet was opened to the public, 50 million people were
connected. It took radio 38 years and TV 13 years to reach that mark

According to Coffman and Odlyzko (1998, p. 2), traffic and capacity for the public
internet grew at 100% per year in the early 1990s, and during 1995 and 1996 this
increased to1000%. In 1997 this settled back again to 100%. They also say that most
reports on the growth rate of the Internet vary widely, however, all show a rapid rate of
growth.

The 100% growth in traffic per year is also demonstrated by the Western Australian
Regional Network Organisation (WARNO) that provides Internet access through the
Perth Academic Research Network (PARNet) to universities and research organisations
in Western Australia. Figure 1 shows the statistics for the traffic transmitted by
WARNO from November 1997 to October 1999 (data sourced from PARNet, 1999).
This shows a general upward trend in traffic transmitted for all institutions, with the
overall total for Feb-99 being almost double of that for Feb-98 and the total for Sep-99
more than double that for Sep-98. Statistics for traffic received by WARNO show a
similar trend.
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Figure 1: Traffic transmitted by WARNO (produced from statistics from PARNet, 1999).
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Figure 2: Growth in number of Internet hosts (produced from statistics from ICS, 1999).

The number of hosts on the Internet is also increasing rapidly. Data collected by the
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Internet Software Consortium was used to produce the graph in Figure 2. It shows an
exponential growth in the number of hosts, reaching 56,218,000 in 1 999, and as the
curve indicates the expected total for the year 2000 to be much higher.

The increasing number of people using the Internet is obviously contributing to the
increase in traffic. However, the content of network traffic is also becoming more
sophisticated and the messages are getting larger. This is due to the use of such things as
streaming video and audio, and web pages with high graphical content. These two
forces are causing a rapid increase in the demands on bandwidth and contribute to
congestion, which at times can cause unacceptable delays in transmission. Some
applications, such as real-time video, are sensitive to delay, and so are rendered useless
at times of congestion. The other aspect is that these bandwidth hungry applications can
also cause delays to other users, and this has already happened. For example, "during
the weeks of November 9 and 16, 1 992, some packet audio/visual broadcasts caused
severe delay problems, especially at heavily used gateways to the National Science
Foundation Network (NSFNET) backbone and in several mid-level networks" (MacKie
Mason & Varian, 1 993, p. 9). In an earlier example "the Internet effectively collapsed in
1 986 before TCP was redesigned to avoid congestion" (Schnizlein, 1 998, p. 52).

The reason the nature of Internet traffic is changing is that the Internet, which originally
started as primarily a research tool is now being used for things such as e-commerce and
entertainment. This has led to the increasing use of things like video conferencing and
time critical transactions. These forms of Internet usage, as well as placing demands on
bandwidth, imply that the introduction of some form of QoS to differentiate them from
less time critical traffic may be of value. There are arguments that simply increasing the
available bandwidth will provide this QoS, while at the same time maintaining the
simple model of the current Internet. However, there are also arguments that a more
complex model may be needed that provides various levels of QoS with an associated
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pricing scheme to manage usage of these levels of QoS. A major part of the debate on
this subject surrounds the trade-off between efficiency, economics and complexity that
exists in introducing QoS and pricing to the Internet. This document will be discussing
some of the issues and also presenting some of the current proposals for pricing Internet
usage.

2.2 Charging for Internet Access - the Present Situation
A common misconception is that the Internet is free. However, this is not the case.
Pricing is on the basis of a flat-rate monthly access fee (with no charge for incremental
usage). Many people are insulated from this cost by being members of an educational
institution or corporate intranet that absorbs the cost of access. At Edith Cowan
University (ECU) for example, Internet access is provided free to students and staff.
This is becoming a problem as the cost is rising significantly each year. The budget
allocation to the communications department at ECU for Internet usage is fixed at
$ 106,000 annually. The bill from the university's service provider, Australian Academic
Research Network (AARnet) for 1 998 was $423,000. The budgetary gap is expected to
be larger this year with the 1 999 second quarter bill at the time of writing at $227,000
and the projected total for 1 999 to be $740,000.

The reason the Internet has flat-rate access charges with no explicit restrictions on the
incremental use of bandwidth is historical. The Internet originated as the Advanced
Research Project Agency Network (ARPANET), a defence research project funded by
the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA). The primary design goal of the
Internet was "survivability in the face of failure" (Clark cited by Fang, 1 996, p. 105).
Owing to this and its military application, there was little or no emphasis on an
accounting infrastructure. As a result most pricing and billing on the Internet is access
based, where users are charged a fixed fee per month for access with no incremental
usage fees. The great advantage of this is that it is simple and gives predictable costs.
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However, the nature of the Internet has changed and is changing rapidly, what was
originally conceived and funded as a research project has grown into a commercial,
global and integrated service network.

The types of flat-rate access in use today, according to Fang ( 1 996, p. 1 05) can be
divided into two groups:
•

By access pipe - dedicated lines are provided to enterprises by Internet service
providers (ISPs) and charged according to the bandwidth supported by the line. This
usually includes a fixed start-up fee and a flat monthly connection fee.

•

By access time - The most common for individual users. Users pay a flat monthly
fee for unlimited access or a fixed amount for a given number of hours with an extra
charge for each hour over the quota.

Another charging scheme that is an extension of the access pipe is used by the
Australian Academic Research Network 2 (AARNet2) which provides the Internet to
the universities in Australia. This scheme provides differential charging. Three bands of
charging exist, on-net (domestic) traffic, off-net (international) traffic and local traffic
between each Regional Network Organisation (RNO). This scheme takes into account
that more distant destinations may require using more expensive links and so it regains
some of the costs for providing those links. However, neither this scheme nor the ones
above take into account the nature or volume of that traffic, effectively allowing
unrestricted use of the line capacity once connected and providing undifferentiated
service to both time-critical and non-time-critical applications alike. This can result in
an effect called the 'tragedy of the commons', which can cause a general degradation in
service.

2. The Case for Usage-Based Pricing
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2.3 'Tragedy of the Commons'
Unrestricted use of a shared resource, according to MacKie-Mason and Varian ( 1995, p.
1 1 41), can lead to what is referred to as the "tragedy of the commons" where public
goods are accessed without regulation, leading to a possible total loss of access. An
example of this is where a public area or "common" is made available for people to
graze their animals, free of charge or restriction. The end result is that people will take
advantage of this and use the common without thought of the consequences to the
general good. In the end the land is overgrazed and useless to everyone. This could be
equated to the present day Internet, with the "common" being the available bandwidth.
The lack of regulation is that users can indiscriminately use the line capacity without
concern for the effect it is having on other users. In light of the increasing use of the
Internet combined with more demanding applications this could lead to a congested
network with reduced value for everyone.

Once the infrastructure of a network is in place, "the short-term incremental cost of
providing passage through fixed capacity computer networks is essentially zero".
(Gupta, Stahl, & Whinston, 1999, p. 58). Given, then that physically sending a packet
costs nothing, the true cost may lie in adding to the "tragedy of the commons". That is,
the cost caused by the congestion and resulting loss in overall value of the network
caused to other users by sending a packet. For this reason, many researchers have
focussed on externality (or congestion) pricing (for example, (Clark & Fang, 1 998;
Fang, 1996; Gupta et al., 1 999; MacKie-Mason & Varian, 1 993; Stahl, Whinston, &
Zhang, 1 998)) . In this scheme the amount of congestion a request for service will cause
on a network is assessed and used to place a value on that service. If the request is made
at a time when the network is not congested, then the cost is essentially zero. This can
be seen as a method of balancing network resource usage, as users will tend to spread
their network use over more economical periods of lower congestion.

2. The Case for Usage-Based Pricing
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There have been many simulations (e.g. Cocchi, Shenker, Estrin, & Zhang, 1 993; Gupta
et al., 1 999; Stahl et al., 1998) that demonstrate the effectiveness of extemality pricing
in providing a more optimal balance in network resource usage than flat-rate pricing. An
example is provided by Gupta el al. ( 1 999) who carried-out a simulation of their
computational approach that produces what they term 'optimal pricing'. 'Optimal prices'
are arrived at by dynamically adjusting prices according to the current level of
congestion. They found this form of usage-based pricing gave significant gains over
fixed charges and time-based charges. The benefits shown include performance
enhancements as well as monetary benefits. Figure 3 shows the benefits gained plotted
against varying levels of traffic volume (exogenous load) placed on the network for the
different pricing schemes with the 'optimal pricing' of their computational approach
coming out well ahead.
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Figure 3: Benefits of Optimal Pricing (Gupta, Stahl, & Whinston, 1995b, p. 11)

These results are supported by a simulation study performed by Stahl, Whinston and
Zhang ( 1 998) that compared Gupta et al.'s optimal pricing with flat-rate charging as
used by America Online (AOL). The findings showed that both users and service
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providers would benefit under an optimal usage-based pricing scheme. They also found
that people are more willing to pay usage based fees than flat-rate fees for Internet use
in return for reduced congestion and will voluntarily choose a subnetwork with optimal
usage-based pricing over another with fixed access fees and no usage charges. The
optimal usage-based charging scheme showed seven times the benefits over the flat-rate
scheme. These benefits being the reduction in congestion and waiting time. The service
provider's benefits were increased profits with the optimally priced usage-based
subnetwork generating five times the profits as flat-rate charging.

Apart from balancing resource usage by spreading network use, the benefits of usage
based pricing stem from the avoidance of what can be referred to as the 'perverse
effects' of flat-rate pricing, where a congested network can actually provide incentives
to create more congestion.

2.4 Perverse effects of Flat-rate Pricing
Odlyzko ( 1997, p. 1 1) describes the case where flat-rate pricing and a congested, slow
network can actually encourage the increase of data transfers. Jokingly referring to the
'World Wide Web' as the 'World Wide Wait' he says tools have been developed to get
better performance while surfing the Web. One such tool is 'PeakJet' that uses the time a
user spends looking at a Web page to download all the pages linked to that page, so that
if the user decides to look at a page later it is quickly available from the local hard disk.
Another similar tool is 'WebWhacker' that can be left to download web pages all night
in case the user wants to view them the next day. The problem is that the more
congested and slower the network is, the more incentive there is to use these tools. Most
computers usually only use a fraction of the capacity of their link to the Internet, these
tools, however, exploit the full available bandwidth. Odlyzko (1997, p. 11) estimates
that it would take less than 200,000 Personal Computers (a very small fraction of those
currently connected) with a connection of 28.8Kbps to completely saturate the Internet
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if they were all downloading web pages at the full rate. Modems can now run at double
this speed, suggesting that it would take far fewer computers to achieve saturation.

Another effect of flat-rate pricing in an undifferentiated QoS network is that it leads to
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) offering tiered quality service. That is, the demands of
users who require a high QoS are catered for by offering separate tiers of service with
different flat-rate charges. A high-speed link will be offered at a higher price (usually
much higher) than a lower speed link. Once a user subscribes to a certain tier, they are
committed to stay with it, no matter how their need for QoS changes. Edell and Varaiya
(1999) point out that in this situation, consumers and suppliers lose out on two counts:
Since tiered service is flat-rated, and demand is quality-sensitive, the waste
at higher speeds is greater, and the flat rate charge is correspondingly
higher. Also, many light users will not subscribe to flat-rated higher quality
service, even though they would occasionally subscribe if the charge were
usage-based. So those users are denied the benefits of higher quality service,
and producers are denied the revenues from those subscribers. (p. 11)

This model using tiered service results in the numbers of subscribers to the higher-speed
links being limited, which reduces the revenues generated by those links. This will
"lower the pace of equipment cost reduction" (Edell & Varaiya, 1999, p. 11) and
provide a disincentive to ISPs to invest in expanding and improving those links. In this
way, flat-rate pricing can be seen to be inhibiting the improvement of QoS on the
Internet.

These kinds of symptoms are the result of a system that is not efficient both in terms of
economics and resource allocation. Usage-based pricing has been demonstrated to
increase efficiency, control resource usage and provide economic benefits to both users
and providers. This was shown in above in Figure 3. Other examples of simulations that
clearly demonstrate these benefits can be found in Cocchi, Shenker, Estrin, & Zhang
(1993), Gupta, Stahl, & Whinston (1997), MacK.ie-Mason & Varian (1995), Parenteau
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& Rishe ( 1997), Rupp, Edell, Chand, & Varaiya ( 1998) and Stahl, Whinston and Zang
( 1998).

Apart from these 'perverse effects', there is also the question of fairness, as different
user applications generate different amounts of traffic and have different bandwidth
requirements, but pay the same access fee as each other under a flat-rate scheme.

2.5 Traffic Volumes and Bandwidth Requirements
Edell, McKeown and Varaiya ( 1995, p. 1 162) point out that different users generate
widely different amounts of traffic. A pricing scheme dividing costs equally among
users would therefore not seem appropriate. Why should a user with low bandwidth
requirements, who is generating small amounts of traffic, pay the same as a user with
more demanding requirements? For example, during a telnet session a user requires
high speed, low volume data transfer for real-time interaction with a server. Whereas a
video-conference needs clarity and co-ordination of picture and sound which requires
high-volume, high-speed transfers with low variability in transfer rates. The telnet user,
generating little traffic, may be experiencing unacceptable delays when sharing the
network with users involved in a video conference, and yet pay the same access fee. It
also may be the case that the users involved in the video-conference would be willing to
pay more for higher bandwidth during the video-conference to guarantee the QoS.

The difference in bandwidth requirements can be illustrated by considering the dramatic
difference between ASCII text and multimedia. According to Lucky (cited in MacKie
Mason & Varian, 1 994):
ASCII text uses about 44 bits per word. Telephone-quality voice uses
2 1 ,000 bits per word, and stereo CD uses 466,000 bits per word. Network
quality video without compression is about 1 00 megabits per second. With
compression, it's about 45 Megabits per second ! - which is the entire
capacity of the NSFNET backbone. (p. 3).
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Presently in the Internet all users are charged the same, regardless of the demands made
on the capacity of the link they have access to. We have the case of light users
subsidising heavy users. ISPs may even find heavy users unprofitable as they place
large demands on link capacity, but pay the same flat rate as light users.

Not only do users generate different amounts of traffic, but also they place different
values on their usage. Sound economic theory dictates that this valuation of service
should be linked to a price.

2.6 User's Valuation of Service
With the present 'best effort' service of the Internet there is no way for a user to indicate
the value they place on a service. All users are treated equally. As Parenteau and Rishe
( 1 997) point out:
There is no deterrent to the user downloading many megabytes in which he
has only limited interest. Whereas the user who is performing time critical
communications, is placed in the same queues as the casual user. Clearly the
latter's preferences are not being served. Nor is the interest of the service
provider since the time-critical user would likely be willing to pay for
improved performance. (p. 93)
This is not an economically efficient state of affairs. As the Internet is moving away
from its research oriented beginnings into a more commercial realm it may have to
adopt policies in line with economic theory. As Schnizlein ( 1 998, p. 52) notes, "an
economically efficient system generates revenue for expansion by matching prices to
user's valuation of the services". There should be incentives for users to use only the
bandwidth they really want, in other words what they are willing to pay for. Linking the
prices to a user's valuation of a service will do this and also give incentives to carriers to
carry out expansion as providing higher levels of offered service means higher income
for the carriers. The willingness of users to pay for a certain level of service would also
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give indicators to service providers of whether expansion is viable or necessary.

To date there has been little or no empirical evidence of how users value different levels
of service. The Internet Demand Experiment (INDEX) currently being run at Berkeley
aims to rectify this situation and has already produced some preliminary results.

2.7 The Internet Demand Experiment (INDEX)
In a model of the Internet that has various levels of QoS, efficiency can be obtained if
the combinations of price and QoS match user needs. (Rupp et al., 1 998, p. 85) says that
to do this service providers must understand "the structure of user demand". A group at
the University of California in Berkeley set out to reach this understanding through the
INDEX experiment, which is a:
Real-world market trial seeking to provide this information [the structure of
user demand] and measure how individuals value Internet usage when they
are offered different Quality of Service choices. (Rupp et al., 1 998, p. 85)
This trial started in April 1 998 and is scheduled to run for two years. It provides Internet
access to about 70 users from the Berkeley campus over Integrated Services Digital
Network lines. Users select network services from a menu of QoS-price offerings and
have to pay for their usage. This involves real monetary costs, which provides the
necessary incentives to users to choose services based on their true valuation of network
resources. Users are offered a sequence of service plans, which make up various
experiments that last about 6- 10 weeks each. Users can instantaneously change their
QoS-price choice, even during a session. They also have instantaneous feedback in the
form of a price meter that shows how much they are spending. The user choices are
monitored and the value a customer places on a service is measured by the time and
money they spend on that service. The experiment only monitors TCP traffic, the
authors citing the fact that TCP makes up the majority of traffic at Berkeley to justify
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this.

The main goals of INDEX are:
•

Measurement of user demand for Internet access as a function of QoS, pricing
structure, and application.

•

Demonstration of an end-to-end system that provides access to a diverse group of
users at attractive price-quality combinations.

The preliminary findings, as published in Edell and Varaiya ( 1 999) show:
•

Charging subscribers a small amount per megabyte caused a 35% drop in network
traffic. (This translated into about $3 per month).

•

When usage is measured by connect time the waste induced by flat-rate pricing is
large.

•

If users are offered various levels of service quality, the demand for more than one
service quality increases. (shows the loss to consumers and providers of tiered
service where consumers are locked into one service quality)

•

The demand for use of high quality services increases if there are a greater number
of high levels of QoS on offer. This is because quality sensitive applications behave
better when the QoS is higher, so there is more attraction to use those applications.
Also, the intangible cost of waiting time of the user is reduced with a higher QoS,
encouraging more use.

•

Under flat-rate tariffs, light users are subsidising heavy users.

The results provide empirical evidence demonstrating that flat-rate pricing is actually
detrimental to the growth of the Internet as it fosters waste and the proliferation of tiered
levels of service, which as discussed earlier, are a negative influence on Internet
expansion. The results also support the introduction of different levels of QoS as it was
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shown that users would choose different levels of QoS if they were available.
Additionally, the availability of higher levels of QoS would encourage the use of more
sophisticated applications that take advantage of the higher QoS and so provide more
incentive for capacity expansion and the provision of the higher levels of QoS. This
would have the effect of increasing the level of user satisfaction while using the
Internet, and may encourage even greater numbers of users to subscribe to the Internet.

The results of INDEX support placing the choice of QoS in the hands of the user and
show that benefits will be obtained by doing so. This view is also held by MacKie
Mason, Murphy & Murphy ( 1 995) and Gupta et al. ( 1 999). The reason users should be
able to select the QoS is that the value a user places on a service is subjective, and
varies across time and application. The QoS, then, should not be tied directly to the
application. Prices can be the controlling link between the users subjective valuation
and the QoS an application receives.

2.8 Quality of Service and Pricing
QoS from a user's perspective can be defined by things like window size, download
time or audio quality. These can be translated into technical terms by considering
probability of packet loss, data transfer rate and consistency of delays of packets.
Different applications require different levels of QoS. For example, email can be
delivered without loss of quality no matter the delay or order of arriving packets. An
interactive game or audio conversation, however, requires a minimum data transfer rate
and an appropriate ordering of packets. However, defining QoS solely on an application
basis has its drawbacks as Gupta et al. ( 1 999, p. 58) point out. Sometimes a user might
want urgent, high priority email and so would require a higher QoS to that mentioned
above for email. A user may want to download a video to view at a later date and so a
lower QoS than mentioned for video would be sufficient. Furthermore, users could
develop 'masking' where an application requiring low QoS can be made to look like an
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application requiring a higher QoS and so gain preferential treatment. A pricing
mechanism can be used as a tool to overcome these problems. Pricing can be used to
differentiate between levels of QoS required by users, if they need urgent email, they
specify this by paying for it. Users would not be forced into paying a high fixed price
for video if they are going to view it later. Pricing would discourage 'masking' by
providing an incentive to maintain an appropriate level of QoS. Gupta et al. (1999, p.
58) contend " that to sustain an e-commerce environment in which each application and
user will require a different QoS, pricing network traffic based on usage will be a
necessity" .

For these reasons MacK.ie-Mason and Varian (1995, p . 3) advocate bringing users back
into the loop by using a form of feedback called responsive pricing. In this scheme, the
QoS (and thus the price) is not set at an application level, but moved back into the
control of the user. The response to this feedback need not be human with its limited
response times. Very sophisticated user behaviour could be automated using pre
programmed network interfaces. This form of automatic feedback control is already
demonstrated by the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) congestion control
algorithms, and so has a pretext for its implementation. Mackie-Mason et al. envisage
that this feedback and response would be dynamic and occurring on a very finely
grained time scale. Discouraging adaptive users from transmitting when the network is
congested and encouraging users to send traffic during lulls, thus increasing network
efficiency. Gupta, Stahl and Whinston (1996) have developed a computational model to
achieve this dynamic adjustment of prices and this is described below in 'Priority
Classes'.

There are several schemes for implementing QoS and, as the main focus of this
document is pricing the Internet, only a brief description of some of these are given in
the section that follows along with their relationship to pricing.
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2.9 Ways of Providing QoS
2.9.1 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM )
ATM is designed to handle the communication requirements of various network
services including data, images, voice, and video. ATM provides the necessary QoS for
time sensitive data such as voice and video by providing a path through the network
with a guaranteed delay time associated with that path. It achieves this by using 'virtual
connections' which are maintained by ATM switches. An ATM network has a similar
operation to the switched telephone network. In ATM, before sending information
relating to a call, a communications path is established. All cells (similar to packets, but
of a fixed size) relating to a call are then made to follow this path and are delivered in
the same order as they were sent. ATM therefore provides QoS using a connection
oriented method. It is because of this connection-oriented nature that Odlyzko (cited in
Tebbutt, 1 998, p. 67) has doubts as to whether ATM is suited to the Internet.

Odlyzko's (cited in Tebbutt, 1 998, p. 67) doubts stem from the fact that most Internet
traffic uses the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) (see Figure 4) and that a
characteristic of HTTP is that it produces 'bursty' traffic. That is, there are long periods
of inactivity followed by short bursts of traffic. For example, a user will not be
generating any traffic while reading a Web page, but will cause a sudden burst of
activity when a link is clicked on. Added to this is the possibility that every link on a
web page could generate traffic from any one of the almost 60,000,000 hosts on the
Internet. It would be a waste of resources, then, to maintain a connection during the
whole time a user is viewing a web page and also the overheads of establishing new
connections every time a different link is clicked would be very large. The bursts of
traffic generated by using HTTP also usually consist of a small number of packets and
so this traffic does not have the well-defined flows that ATM was designed for. It can
be concluded then that ATM doesn't resolve the problem of minimising delay for time
critical customers with 'bursty' traffic who are willing to pay for a reduction in traffic.
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According to Odlyzko these customers are important and should not be ignored by
relying solely on ATM to provide QoS:
Web browsing encompasses a variety of important applications, many of
them mission-critical, such as when your customers might be ordering from
you or your doctor might be looking up information relevant to your
sickness. It's all transacted through the HTTP protocol (Odlyzko cited in
Tebbutt, 1 998, p. 68)

According to Odlyzko, cited in the same article, this importance will continue into the
future and so should be a concern in any QoS proposals.

Statistics on the WARNO from July 1 997 to November 1 999 (taken from PARNet,
1 999) support the view that HTTP traffic is the most predominant on the Internet with
HTTP making up 61 % of the traffic (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Traffic received by WARNO - Jul'97 to Nov'99, by protocol (produced from statistics
from PARNet, 1999)

However, regardless of its lack of value in providing QoS for HTTP traffic, ATM is
effective for things like video and audio due to their need for a guaranteed QoS and
their characteristics of consisting of flows of traffic that can't tolerate out of order
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packets or long delays.

2.9.2 Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP)
RSVP is a method of providing QoS in Ethernet/IP networks. RSVP:
reserves bandwidth between a sender and a receiver by examining each link
along the route. The sender interrogates each network device [router] along
the route. If each device has spare bandwidth available the path is
established, if not the sender is informed (Engel & Maj, 1 999, p. 2).
In RSVP a reservation commits resources to a user request, in which case Schnizlein
( 1 998, p. 53) notes "admission control for reservations is the logical place to handle
commitment to pay for those resources". Policies that define the admission control
would be held on a separate 'policy server'. When a user makes a request for resources,
routers would request a policy decision from the policy server before allocating the
requested resources. The policy server would interact with the billing system to produce
the necessary pricing information for the request.

Since the resources for a transmission are reserved and all the characteristics of the
reservation are known, billing would be simple. It would be much like billing for
telephone calls, that is, based on duration and capacity.

A disadvantage to RSVP is pointed out by Schnizlein ( 1 998, p. 53). All the routers
along the transmission path would have to maintain the state for each reservation. This
can be expensive, especially when you consider that "reservations can be specified for
individual flows from any application on any computer to another" (Schnizlein, 1 998, p.
53). This means that the potential number of reservations is larger than the number of
pairs of communicating computers. Schnizlein goes on to say "The feasibility of
supporting the potentially huge number reservations aggregated near the center of the
Internet is questioned."
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RSVP is suitable for consistent flows such as real-time audio or video because it
reserves the necessary resources along the transmission path to guarantee the necessary
QoS. However, as regards 'bursty' HTTP traffic, it suffers the same problems as ATM
Its main advantages, though, are that it provides ATM-like QoS over an Ethernet/IP
network and a simple model for billing.

2.9.3 Internet Protocol Version 6 (1Pv6)
1Pv6 is the next generation Internet protocol that, among other things, will introduce a
way of specifying the QoS of packets. It will do this by introducing traffic class and
flow label fields that allow nodes in the network "to distinguish certain packets for
possible special treatment by a router" (Lee, Lough, Midkiff, IV, & Benchoff, 1 998, p.
30). The class field which was formerly known as the priority field in Internet Protocol
Version 4 (1Pv4), can be used to specify the type of application the data belongs to, for
example a real-time application. (This would be set to all zeros for normal applications).
The flow label field's function is to allow packets that have the same flow label to be
treated by routers with the same specialised processing. For example, packets belonging
to a video transmission would be tagged with the class field for video, and so that all
packets in that transmission can be identified as belonging to the same stream, they
would all be marked with the same flow label.

The possibility of being able to specify different levels of quality of service (QoS) with
1Pv6, as with other methods, means that it may be necessary to introduce some form of
control to prevent everyone choosing the highest QoS all the time. Without this control
the point of having differential QoS would be lost. Placing a higher economic value on a
higher level of service has been shown to provide this control, as shown by simulations
by groups such as Gupta et al. ( 1 999) (see Figure 3). There is currently a movement to
introduce 1Pv6 which underlines the need to implement some form of Internet pricing.
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2.10 Do we need differential QoS?
Another aspect to QoS is that, in general, the lower the utilisation rate on a network, the
higher the QoS the network provides. This is noted by Odlyzko (1998b):
Even the notoriously congested trans-Atlantic links do appear to provide
good performance for applications as demanding as packet telephony in the
early hours of Sunday morning. What this says is that even without any new
QoS technologies, one can provide excellent quality by lowering utilization.
(p. 9)

Lower utilisation can be achieved by increasing the amount of available bandwidth.
This leads to the idea of over-engineering the networks and providing a 'fat pipe' that
will give a high QoS to everyone. Another way would be to provide different 'pipes' or
'channels' with varying levels of utilisation and so provide a range of QoS. This idea is
outlined by Odlyzko (1997) in the Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) scheme (see below).

Taking the approach of providing QoS through reducing utilisation by increasing
bandwidth (as proposed by Odlyzko (1998a; and 1998b)) has the great advantage of
being simple. This approach maintains the current best effort service of the Internet,
which has proved very successful to date. It avoids the likely high cost and
complications of implementing a differential QoS scheme. It also avoids a serious
defect of many proposed QoS schemes, which is that they require deployment
throughout the Internet to be effective. The problem with this is that the Internet is a
heterogeneous environment that lacks any central control, making it difficult to install
end-to-end schemes.

Apart from adding complexity, Odlyzko provides economic reasons why implementing
differential QoS may not be effective. In the U.S., data communications cost about $80
billion in 1997, which was 13% of total information technology (IT) spending. Actual
data transmission accounted for:
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only 20% of total for data communications, and 2.6% of total for all of IT.
Thus data lines are a small part of the entire IT picture, and any scheme that
attempts to improve their performance has to be weighed against costs that it
might impose on the rest of the system. It is better to double the spending on
transmission than to increase the average cost of all other IT systems by 3%.
(Odlyzko, 1 998b, p. 7)

When you consider the complexity and cost of implementing a QoS scheme on the
Internet and the pressure this will place on developers and network managers, along
with the declining cost of bandwidth, it may be more cost effective to bypass the QoS
issue by improving transmission capacities.

Further to the above, Odlyzko in a 1 998 study found that, contrary to popular belief,
most of the Internet is not congested. He found that long distance data links, backbone
links and corporate private line links are lightly used:
While the long distance circuit switched voice network has average
utilization of about 33%, the Internet backbone links appear to have average
utilizations closer to 10% to 1 5%, and corporate long-haul links (which is
where the bulk of data transport capacity is) have utilizations in the 3% to
5% range. (Odlyzko, 1 998a, p. 3)
He contends that the congestion occurs at key choke points, for example public
exchange points and network access points. The key to solving the problem of
congestion of bandwidth then, could be to address the key choke points, which Odlyzko
( 1 998b, p. 5) says "should not be too expensive to eliminate".

However, Odlyzko admits that there is some contention about the significance of these
points to congestion, and "there is still no consensus as to what causes the poor
observed performance" (Odlyzko, 1 998b, p. 4) of the Internet. A possible answer is put
forward by Mackie-Mason and Varian ( 1 994, p. 3), who say that low average
utilisation rates on backbones are misleading because: "IP traffic is very bursty and
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peak usage can be 10 times the average". An example of this is described by Smarr and
Catlett (cited in MacKie-Mason & Varian, 1993):
If a single remote visualization process were to produce lOOMps bursts, it
would take only a handful of users on the national network to generate over
1Gbps load. As the remote visualization services move from three
dimensions to [animation] the single-user bursts will increase to several
hundred Mbps . . . Only for periods of tens of minutes to several hours over a
24-hour period are the high-end requirements seen on the network. With
these applications, however, network load can jump from average to peak
instantaneously. (p. 9)

This highlights the problem with all averages, there may be peaks in usage that could
occur at a critical time which causes delays to other users. These peaks, however, will
not be visible when an average is taken over a period of time.

Although there is contention about some of the causes of delays, it is not disputed that
there are a large number of problems which cause delays that are not related to
deficiencies in data transmission. For example, the main sources of consumer
complaints are delays in email which are often caused by mail-server problems, and
Web surfing delays which are mainly caused by server overloads. There is doubt
whether a QoS scheme would solve these problems. According to Odlyzko (1998b, p.
5), it is possible that "making the entire system more complicated, increasing the
computational burden on the routers, and increasing the numbers and lengths of queues"
by introducing a QoS system, would aggravate the situation.

There are differing opinions on whether sufficient bandwidth will be available to
provide 'fat pipes', these arguments are discussed in the next section.

--
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2.11 Free Bandwidth?
There is an argument that bandwidth will soon be virtually free as "semiconductor
densities are doubling every1 8 months, photonic bandwidths are doubling every 1 2 and
wireless bandwidths are doubling every 9" (Metcalfe, 1 998, p. 130). (These advances
even outstrip the gains in microprocessor power, which has been doubling every 12
months). Advocates of this argument maintain that it would be better to keep the simple
flat rate charging scheme and provide a single high quality of service to all users.
However, in the same article Metcalfe also points out that Internet traffic doubles every
4 months, the number of Internet users is rising, the amount of time each user spends on
the Internet is going up and the bandwidth usage of new applications is increasing.
Regardless of bandwidth getting cheaper, these increasing demands will make
bandwidth scarce, this scarcity naturally affecting its price. Metcalfe (1998, p. 1 30) says
that these pressures mean "the Internet can no longer be an economics free zone". This
is backed up by Fishburn and Odlyzko ( 1 998, p. 1 29) who say "more than two decades
of experience have shown that any bandwidth gets saturated quickly".

The argument that bandwidth is scarce and that any advances in bandwidth supply will
soon be saturated is not clear-cut, however. Odlyzko, in a paper on the economics of the
Internet goes against previous arguments for providing differential QoS, giving
evidence that "providing enough bandwidth for uniformly high quality transmission
may be practical" (Odlyzko, 1 998b, p. 1 ). He gives the example of the University of
Waterloo where a " 12 fold jump in network bandwidth from 128Kbps to 1.5Mbps in
July 1 994 did not cause traffic to jump suddenly by a factor of 12. Instead, it continued
to grow at its usual pace." (Odlyzko, 1 998b, p. 3). This steady rate of growth is also
displayed in the Internet (apart from the anomalous period in 1 995 and 1996) with
traffic doubling every year. The argument is that although the growth rate is rapid, it is
predictable, and expansion to networks can be planned to cope with it. Added to this is
that unit prices for transmission capacity will fall and total spending on high bandwidth
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connections will rise, making expansion economically feasible.

If the technical problems of Wave Division Multiplexing (WDM) can be overcome, the
argument that bandwidth will remain scarce may not be valid. WDM is a technique that
"allows separate communications channels to be sent on different colours of light"
(Tebbutt & Taylor, 1998, p. 95). This would provide huge increases to bandwidth, even
in existing fibre-optic lines, so much so that "the whole world's Internet traffic could be
pumped down one fibre" (Payne cited in Tebbutt & Taylor, 1998, p. 96). However, the
technical problems are large and Tebbutt goes on to say: "WDM transmitters remain
tremendously expensive and sensitive devices with fine-grained laser controls and
mirror adjustments" that make them impractical at the moment. There is also the fact
that this would only benefit areas connected to fibre-optic lines.

The fast growth and rapidly changing nature of every aspect of computing makes it
difficult to predict whether sufficient gains will be made in bandwidth provision or if
any gains will be quickly negated by higher usage. One thing is certain though, and that
is computing is becoming more and more complex and difficult to manage. The
tendency, then, may be to adopt the simpler approach to QoS. This view is upheld by
Odlyzko (1998b, p. 6), saying: "optimality is unattainable, and we should seek the
simplest scheme that works and provides necessary transmission quality".
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3. THE CASE AGAINST USAGE-BASED PRICING

3.1 Accounting and Transaction Cost
The major objection to usage-based pricing is the accounting and transaction cost. The
comparison can be made to telephony where the administrative costs can be 50% or
more of the cost of making a call (McKnight & Bailey, 1995, p. 1 1). MacKie-Mason
and Varian ( 1994, p. 2), however, believe that it depends on how well the prices are
designed as to whether the benefits exceed the transaction and accounting costs.
Certainly is has been shown in simulations (as mentioned above) that usage-based
pricing can be an effective means of improving network efficiency and providing
benefits to both users and network access providers. So, in simulations at least, the
benefits would seem to outweigh the costs.

3.2 Overheads
Apart from the economic concerns, Shenker et al. (1996, p. 1 88) doubt that pricing
based on congestion is even implementable due to technical difficulties (these are
discussed further in the description of the 'Smart Market', below). One of these
difficulties is the overhead involved in accounting for traffic on a packet level
considering the number of packets traversing the Internet. In one month in 1997 the
estimated traffic on Internet backbones was 3000 terabytes (Coffman & Odlyzko, 1 998,
p. 24). This already represents a huge number of packets and is currently doubling every
year. Researchers such as Shenker et al. ( 1996) and Odlyzko ( 1998b) are concerned
about this overhead.
Usage-based pricing may also introduce overwhelming complexity. This can be in the
form of calculating the degradation to network performance and loss of utility to other
users of performing a transmission in order to set a price. (Shenker et al. (1996, p. 1 92)
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maintains that this may not even be possible). It could also be the complexity of new
protocols that indicate whether the sender or receiver is going to pay. These issues are
discussed more fully below in connection with each proposed pricing scheme.

Network managers may also be concerned about extra complexity and added monetary
costs. The development and installation of a usage-based pricing may be expensive in
terms of hardware and software. Additionally, monitoring and maintaining a usage
based pricing mechanism may add complexities and extra work to the daily tasks of an
already busy network manager.

The complexities that could be introduced by usage-based pricing may destroy the
simplicity of the connectionless, best-effort service that has so far made the Internet so
successful. Part of this simplicity is also provided by the flat-rate pricing scheme
currently in use. Flat-rate pricing is generally preferred by users and as a result there is
resistance to introducing usage-based pricing.

3.3 Preference for Flat-rate Pricing
The preference for flat-rate pricing has been demonstrated in telephony where, in a
study of the Bell System in 1 970 (Cosgrove & Linhart cited in Odlyzko, 1 997, p. 1 2), it
was found that consumers are willing to pay more for a flat-rate plan than they would
under a usage-based scheme. In data networking large organisations also show a
preference for flat-rate pricing. For example, branches of the United States armed forces
built their own networks when the United States (US) Defence Data Network
introduced usage-based pricing (Bailey cited in Odlyzko, 1 997, p. 12).

Odlyzko ( 1 997, p. 1 2) cites Cosgrove & Linhart giving three reasons why consumers
prefer flat-rates:
1. Predictability - Users know in advance how much the service will cost. This avoids
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the worry of receiving a sudden large bill that hasn't been budgeted for.
2. Overestimate of usage - Users typically overestimate how much they use a service,
and so calculate that they will be better off paying a flat-rate.
3. When users are charged on how much they use they tend to worry whether their use
of the service is worth the cost. The result is that usage is reduced. This was
observed in the US where charges for local calls had the effect of shortening the
length of calls.

Service providers also prefer flat-rates. With flat-rates there will be no need for the
potentially costly development of a traffic measurement and charging mechanism.
Accepting the fact that consumers are willing to pay more for a flat-rate plan, there may
be more profits to be gained by service providers. (Although simulations of usage-based
pricing have actually shown increased profits for service providers, see Stahl et al.
(1998) ). Also, flat-rates allow for more profitable marketing strategies, such as bundling
strategies (selling combinations of goods at a single price) and bulk-buy offers. An
example of this would be the current offer of Telstra Australia for international phone
calls in blocks of half an hour at a reduced price.

Parallels with telephony are always made in the argument between flat-rate and usage
based pricing. However, data network pricing is different. To make a call on a telephone
takes time, so even if the telephone was only priced with a flat monthly fee, a user
would still not spend all day making calls. Odlyzko (1997, p. 13), on discussing flat-rate
charging for local calls in the US, says that average households make only about five
local calls a day of about four minutes each, even though making more calls would cost
no more. However, a computer could be connected to the Internet all day and be using
bandwidth without human intervention. Without usage-based pricing there is no
incentive not to do this, even if the content being downloaded is of little interest.
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4. WHO PAYS?
4.1 Sender or Receiver?
A major issue in implementing any usage-based pricing scheme is who pays, the sender
or the receiver? This has two aspects, one is the mechanics of indicating who pays,
which can introduce further complications in an already complicated scenario. The
various methods will be discussed with each alternative billing solution.
The second aspect is who should pay? In the case of surfing the Internet, a user visiting
different sites will cause content to be downloaded to their computer simply by viewing
a page. This could include things like graphics, audio or video clips. Parenteau and
Rishe (1997, p. 98) suggest that the user should naturally be billed for this traffic as they
are the one who initiated the transfer However, in these days of commercialism on the
Internet, why should a user pay for the transfer of advertising material, simply because
an organisation chooses to put it on their Web page? Surely the organisation that placed
that material on the Internet should pay, as they are the ones who benefit from it. On the
other hand, making everyone who places content on the Internet pay for its transfer will
severely restrict amount of information available on the Internet. It would transform the
Internet into a purely advertising domain. However, a case where it would be
appropriate to make a user pay for downloading files from the Internet is where a link to
a file is placed on a page that a user has the option of downloading, for example a
demonstration version of a game. It may prove a difficult issue to decide who is
benefiting from a data transfer, then, if that can be resolved, there still remains the
complex issue of how to indicate the willingness to pay.
Deciding who will pay may involve some form of negotiation with a request for
payment being made and a corresponding acceptance or refusal. There may also be
cases where the sender and receiver should share the cost of transfer, which may also
need some form of negotiation. This implies the introduction of new protocols and
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increased complexity, which may prove difficult to implement. The complexities
increase further when multicasting is considered.

4.2 What About Multicasting?
Multicasting brings up the issue of how to share the cost of a single data flow that is
shared among many receivers. In general it would be appropriate to bill the receivers
because they initiate the joining of a multicast group. (However, there could be cases
where a sender-receiver, cost splitting would be appropriate). The question is how to
share the cost amongst a group of receivers that could be potentially very large and also
be changing in size dynamically as members join and leave. Herzog, Shenker and Estrin
( 1997) put forward accounting mechanisms and policies that can be used to determine
these cost shares on a finely grained scale. However, what is not addressed in this
proposal is how to reduce the costs of the first few members who join, as the cost will
be high when it is divided amongst a small number of receivers. Shenker et al. ( 1 996, p.
1 99) suggest a potential member could put a cap on the amount they are willing to pay
to limit their exposure to cost to avoid this. A problem with this though, as Shenker et
al. also point out, is that it could lead to receivers getting a 'free-ride' on other receivers
who have joined a group using a low price.

The proposals of Herzog et al. (1 997) use cost sharing approaches that depend on the
number of receivers downstream of each link involved in a multicast session. Service
providers who have a large number of receivers in their network would therefore be
charged a larger proportion of the total cost of the multicast than service providers
having less receivers. For the cost sharing to work, service providers would have to
reveal the true number of receivers on their network. As Shenker et al. ( 1 996, p. 1 99)
note, the problem here is that there is no incentive for providers to reveal this number as
it would expose them to greater costs.
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Many of the issues of multicasting as well as those mentioned in previous sections
remain unresolved to date. There are numerous proposals for usage-based pricing
mechanisms that attempt to resolve some of these problems. A sample of these are
discussed in the following sections along with further elaboration of the issues and the
way they may be resolved.
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5. ALTERNATIVE USAGE-BASED PRICING SCHEMES

5.1 Volume Pricing
One of the easiest and simplest methods of usage-based pricing is charging simply on
the total number of bytes or packets that pass through a subscriber's interface, known as
volume pricing. This could be seen as fairer than flat-rate pricing, as a heavy user would
be paying costs which are more in proportion to their use. This was shown in an INDEX
experiment using volume pricing:
The three heaviest users account for about 3GB of data and 35 percent of
total expenditures in the actual experiment. Under a flat-rate tariff, however,
these three users would only account for . . . 5 percent of the total
expenditures. (Edell & Varaiya, 1 999, p. 1 3)
Furthermore, the experiment found that the heaviest 30 percent of users would pay less
under a flat-rate scheme and the remaining 70 percent of light users would pay more.
This means that volume pricing would avoid the case of light users subsidising heavy
users.

Volume pricing has already been successfully implemented in New Zealand (NZ) as
described in Brownlee ( 1994). This provided a charging scheme for the shared use of a
common Internet link by NZ universities. The goals of the scheme were to:

•

Measure traffic in both directions through NZGate (NZ's link to the Internet) for
each participating site and charge for it by volume: i.e. for the number of Megabytes
moved in and out each month.

•

Charge enough to cover actual costs, plus a percentage for development

•

Use the resulting development funds to buy more capacity as demand grows
(Brownlee, 1 994, p. 1 )
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According to Brownlee ( 1994, p. 6) the success of this scheme was demonstrated by
subsequent substantial upgrades that were funded by the generated revenues. He also
adds that "users have always perceived that their payments were closely related to the
benefits they derived". This perception being enhanced by the improvement in service
given by the network upgrades.

To provide predictability of costs, they introduced 'committed traffic volume' per
month. The price per Megabyte would decrease as the volume purchased increased. A
site would commit to paying for a certain volume per month, then if actual traffic
volumes fell outside the committed amount for more than a month, the committed
volume would be changed to the actual rate. This cost predictability was another factor
in the scheme's success.

Congestion was taken into account on a coarse scale by discounting on a time of day
basis to encourage off-peak usage. This scheme introduces overheads, as traffic peaks
have to be monitored consistently to keep up with shifts in peak usage. Shifts in usage
patterns can actually be caused by introducing time of day discounts, as users move to a
more economical off-peak time, creating a new peak. (The measurement of the shifting
of traffic peaks with time-of-day pricing will be a subject of a future INDEX experiment
(Edell & Varaiya, 1 999, p. 4)). According to Gupta et al. ( 1999) this traffic pattern
monitoring with the subsequent updating of prices to match, along with the accounting
of individual packets introduces similar overheads to more optimal pricing proposals
that relate the cost of transmission directly to the cost of sending a packet. This reduces
the attractiveness of volume pricing. However, although Brownlee ( 1 994, p. 6) says that
"The overheads of charging are significant" he goes on to say "The benefits provided by
charging are, however, well worth their cost to us".
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Schnizlein ( 1 998) is not convinced that volume pricing is an answer and in addition to
the concerns of high overheads he describes a 'perverse effect' of volume pricing that
could encourage network use in times of congestion:
TCP will increase its rate until congestion signals the limit of capacity. Total
traffic moves more quickly when the network is unloaded - at no effective
cost - which increases charges per unit of time. Users may prefer to use the
network during peak periods when traffic is slower and it is easier to limit
the volume of their traffic (p. 54).
The result is that users may not be encouraged to use the network at off-peak times even
though this would improve network efficiency and improve response times.

Volume pricing places a value on network traffic. Additionally, different types of traffic
can be given different values. For example, in NZ, low priority traffic such as email is
discounted at 30% and the full rate charged for high priority traffic such as TELNET.
This can give more efficiency by reducing waste as well as providing a fairer system
that charges less for traffic that is less demanding. However, it doesn't take into account
the value a user places on their traffic. The high priority traffic will still be charged the
full rate at any time (within the time of day block). Email will still be treated the same
no matter how urgent it is. The only choice for the user is to send or not send. Volume
pricing, then, does provide some management of resource usage, mainly by reducing
waste, and by spreading usage on a coarse scale using time of day discounts. In
summary there are:

Advantages:
•

It is fairer than flat-rate pricing. Additionally, users feel that payments are directly
related to the benefits derived.

•

A value is placed on the traffic generated, and even though this is not linked to the
social costs of congestion, it does provide some benefits in controlling wasteful
usage.
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It allows for bulk selling of volume, with its associated benefits of cost predictability
and discounts.

•

It is simple to implement, with the software to perform the accounting already

available and in use.
•

It has been tried before and proven successful.

•

It provides indicators and revenue for expansion.

•

It is not built into the network architecture.

•

No changes are required to protocols or routers.

•

It does not assume the Internet is a homogeneous environment.

Disadvantages:
•

There is no provision for different levels of QoS.

•

It does not take into account fluctuations in congestion levels and so is unaware of
the social costs of a demand for service.

•

Apart from choosing a more economical time of day, the only choice for the user to
economise is not send a packet.

•

Time of day usage patterns have to be continually monitored to provide time of day
discounts.

•

There are high overheads in traffic accounting and charging.

Although there are some very attractive benefits to Volume Pricing, that at least in NZ
outweigh the disadvantages, it does not provide the finely-grained control promised by
'optimal pricing' schemes. 'Optimal' schemes link prices directly to the social cost of
congestion and allow users to decide the value they will place on a service. This is
becoming of increasing importance with the growing need to introduce some form of
differential service to the Internet. Two of these 'optimal pricing' schemes of note are
the 'Smart Market' proposed by Mackie-Mason and Varian ( 1995), and 'Priority Classes'
proposed by Gupta et al. ( 1 996).
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5.2 Smart Market
According to MacKie-Mason and Varian ( 1 995, p. 1 ) "A communication network is as
good or as bad as its users perceive it to be. Network performance should therefore be
measured in terms of overall user satisfaction." This philosophy led them to propose the
'Smart Market'. This scheme is based on the idea that a user's demands on the network
affect other users and their satisfaction. That is, the traffic generated by one user will
consume a certain amount of resources on the network, and so degrade the performance
of the network for other users. In times of heavy traffic the network will become
congested and display a noticeable degradation of performance for all users. The cost to
a user's performance, then, can be directly related to the congestion that another user's
demands cause on the network. MacKie-Mason and Varian contend that to achieve
optimal efficiency, usage-based charges must equal this cost of congestion caused by a
user's actions.

The Smart Market is based on a generalised Vickrey auction, which is:
a well known scheme for assigning a good to the agent who places the
highest value on it, when individual valuations are private information. The
idea is to solicit bids and award the good to the highest bidder, but charge
the second highest bid as the price. Bidding ones true valuation is a
dominant strategy for each agent (MacKie-Mason, 1 997, p. 12).
Bidding the true valuation is a well-known and important part of the Smart Market.

Using the Smart Market (see Figure 5) a user would send a packet with a bid for the
price they are willing to pay in the current interval. The network gateway sorts the bids
and admits, in descending order, only those it can accommodate without degrading the
network performance below a certain bound. Users are charged only the maximum bid
of packets not allowed in. Thus users only pay the congestion cost and get to keep all
the excess value above the cut-off bid. It also means users only get service if it costs
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them less than their valuation of the service. If the network is not congested, then all
packets will be admitted and the cost will reduced to a minimum. During times of
congestion the low bid packets would be delayed until the burst of congestion eases,
with the high bid packets being given priority. The reduced delay for high bid packets
would give them a higher QoS.

As mentioned, this scheme provides incentives for bidding the true value, so users won't
be tempted to select an inappropriate bid to obtain a higher level of service than needed.
This is so because the price a user pays is not set by the priority they set but by the bid
of the first packet rejected from the network. (a proof of this is provided in MacKie
Mason (1997, p. 12)).
Internet gateway

Arri1,·ing packets.
containing a bid of
price the user is
willing to pay

Gateway smts the
packets by bid, only
allows entiy if the bid is
above a ruH1ffpt,int, set
to control congestion.
Figure 5: Smart Market

Users charged the
highest bid not allowed
entry. Cost = cost of
congestion. No
congestion, no cost.
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Advantages
It can be concluded that:

•

Those with the highest cost of delay get served first.

•

It relates a user's valuation of a service to the price as well as the QoS the user

application receives. This puts the user in control by enabling the level of QoS to be
selected based on how much the user is willing to pay, avoiding the problem of
linking QoS directly to the application type.
•

Prices are directly linked to the 'true' cost of sending a packet. This is a positive
influence on resource management and economics by spreading demand to less
congested times and leaving the network to those willing to pay the price of sending
packets during congestion.

•

It provides indicators for capacity expansion of the networks because the price for

network usage is set to the value of the packets not admitted to the network. If the
cumulative value of those rejected packets is greater than the cost of expanding the
network, then it is appropriate to go ahead with that expansion.
•

It provides a certain predictability in charges, because the actual price paid will

always be equal to or lower than the bid.
•

It adjusts prices dynamically, with the price automatically reduced to zero at times

of low congestion. When there is congestion the price will increase, but never more
than the bid price.

Economically, the Smart Market is a reasonable proposal, but there are concerns over
technical implementation issues. The Smart Market, as well as other schemes such as
that proposed by Gupta et al. (1999) (described below), involve computing the cost of
congestion and using this to create an optimal balance in network usage that contributes
to the common welfare of users. Shenker et al. (1996, p. 188) contend that, apart from
possibly not being cost effective, it is questionable whether such a mechanism is
actually implementable because the costs of congestion are extremely difficult to

5. Alternative Usage-based Pricing Schemes

42

calculate and fundamentally unknowable. They give several reasons, which are included
here in the disadvantages of the Smart Market:

Disadvantages:
•

Accurate bids cannot be submitted - Users have to submit a bid based on their
valuation of the service. A losing bid on a packet will cause some unknown amount
of delay rather than a complete loss of the service. This is because the rejected
packet will be retransmitted at a later time. This means the bid must reflect the
utility loss caused by the delay, rather than the valuation of the service itself. So the
delay associated with each bid level needs to be known to make an accurate bid, and
this delay is unknown.

•

There is a complex relationship between the fate of packets caused by congestion
and the resulting change in a user's utility. Some applications are very sensitive to
delay or dropping of packets and some are not. An optimal pricing scheme would
have to take these different delay and drop sensitivities into account

•

Advances in technology can quickly change the relationship between packet loss or
delay and application utility. For example, advances in congestion control could
decrease an application's sensitivity to packet loss.

•

It also assumes the Internet to be monolithic, which it is not. When a user bids a
price for a message, how is that apportioned over multiple networks that forward the
message? Parenteau and Rishe ( 1 997, p. 94) point out that even in a single network
packets may traverse many nodes and it's not clear what happens when a packet's
bid price enables it to be forwarded from one or more nodes, but then delayed
indefinitely in a higher priced node. To avoid this, the bidding method would have
to be extended to evaluate the entire path and "this entails a distributed multiple
good auction of daunting complexity" (Shenker et al., 1 996, p. 1 89).

•

The queuing and sorting of bids at the gateways would introduce delays m
transmission.
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Most applications involve a sequence of packets and the effect on utility of delaying
or dropping one packet depends on the treatment given to the other packets. For
example, almost all the packets in a transmission may have been transmitted without
incurring significant charges, but the last crucial few may be dropped, leaving the
user wishing that the bids had been concentrated on the last packets. Alternatively, a
few crucial packets may get dropped first, but after other packets had started their
journey, effectively wasting the bids on the later, now worthless packets.

•

It will be unsatisfactory to users because, considering the above reasons, it will be
impossible to predict how much it will cost to send any single packet.

In light of these concerns, Shenker et al. ( 1 996, p. 1 9 1 ) suggest that "It is important to
allow prices to be based on some approximation of congestion costs, but it is important
to not force them to be equal to those congestion costs. " They propose that no pricing
policy should be embedded in the network architecture, to allow different providers a
choice in how they charge. This gives rise to their scheme of Edge Pricing.

5.3 Edge Pricing
Edge Pricing describes the location at which pricing occurs, which is on the edge, or
outer border of the network. This means traffic accounting and charging is done only at
the points of entry and exit to a network. Each service provider then becomes
responsible for allocating the cost of packets crossing their network, and no more. There
is no need to calculate costs on an end-to-end basis in the case of packets having to
transit several intermediate networks to reach their destination. Edge Pricing also avoids
having to impose a homogeneous pricing system on the heterogeneous make-up of the
Internet.

Shenker et al. (1996) put forward a model for Edge Pricing that is an alternative to
responsive pricing schemes such as MacK.ie-Mason and Varian's ( 1995) Smart Market
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and Gupta et al's. ( 1 996) Priority Classes. Due to Shenker et al's. (1996, p. 1 92) claims
that the true congestion costs, which responsive schemes rely on, are inaccessible (see
the disadvantages of the Smart Market above), Shenker et al. propose two
approximations which can be used instead to place a price on various offered service
classes:
1 . Use the expected congestion conditions at a particular time of day. The time of day
is related to expected congestion conditions within the realm of a particular network
or service provider. Different time-zones with the different congestion patterns are
not an issue in Edge Pricing as each network is only responsible for packets entering
and leaving its sphere of influence.
2. Replace the cost of the actual path with the cost of the expected path through the
network, with the charge only dependent on the source and destination of the flow
and not on the route. In the case of a packet crossing an intermediate network the
path from source to destination in that network would trace the route from the entry
point to the exit point.
Using these two approximations the price can be worked out before a transfer occurs
because you know the expected congestion along an expected path. This means the
price can be calculated locally at the access point, or edge, of the network where the
user's packets enter. Where networks are interconnected, the network providers
purchase service from each other, the same way that users purchase service. If a packet
has to cross two networks to travel from user to destination, the first network provider,
using its own pricing policy, can calculate the total cost the packet will incur from the
entry point to the exit point of its network and bill the user. When the packet enters the
second network it can then bill the first based on its own pricing policy. Each provider
takes full responsibility for each packet entering its network (see Figure 6). Bilateral
agreements between connected providers provide the necessary cost shifting, these
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agreements being based on aggregate usage and not on individual flows. This simplifies
costing and enables different service providers to develop their own costing strategies
and offer things like special deals, such as bulk discounts, as found among the various
telephone service providers.

I \
Border routers

On entf)· of packets at router
A, ISPl calculates end to end
cost of route from A to B
using time-of-day c.Xlll.b>estion
costs on the expected route
through the ISP · Bill the
:1.eitding host

1SP2 calculates cost
from C to D, and bills
lSP I

Figure 6: Edge Pricing

The above describes the case where the sender of the traffic is billed, however, there are
many cases where the receiver should be billed. A lot of Internet traffic involves users
accessing servers and downloading material. If the servers had to pay for this traffic,
they would soon disappear. To be able to bill the receivers of the traffic, the billing must
occur in the opposite direction. For this to happen there must be some way for the
receiver to indicate a willingness to pay, for example, a new control message generated
by the receiver indicating this willingness. Then the packets have to be charged
according to the receiver's contract with its provider, rather than the sender's contract.
This means the packet, on entry to a network, must be charged to the next hop, instead
of the previous one.

Using the first approximation of expected congestion conditions at a time of day is
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similar to telephone networks where time-of-day pricing encourages users to shift their
usage to more economical times. Unlike responsive pricing schemes, this doesn't take
into account any instantaneous fluctuations in congestion. Packets sent with a high QoS
would still be charged the high price during a lull in network traffic. However, Shenker
et al. (1996, p. 192) claim that this is not an issue because the onus can be moved back
to the user to monitor the fluctuations in congestion. A lower service class will give
equal performance to a higher service class in times of low congestion. So instead of
changing the prices, the requested QoS can be changed by the user. This means that the
network doesn't reduce costs in times of lower congestion, but the user selects a lower
service class and is charged less for that service. Shenker et al. (1996, p. 192) suggest
the user in this case, can be automated in the form of adaptation routines embedded in
the application, allowing rapid and complex modifications of service class. Moving the
onus to the user keeps the network simple and moves the responsibility to adapt to
current network conditions outside the network, which is inline with the present Internet
design philosophy. Shenker et al. (1996, p. 193) make the point that it would also seem
sensible to make the applications themselves, with their varying sensitivities to network
conditions, responsible for their own behaviour, giving the reason that "it seems
preferable to place the bulk of the variability where it can be done in the most informed
way."

The second approximation of using the expected path, rather than the actual path is
proposed by Shenker et al. to take the uncertainty out of setting prices and also to
provide a fairer pricing system:
Having the price of the service depend on the network's decision about
routing seems an unnecessary source of price variation that makes it harder
for the user to make informed plans about network use. Moreover, when
alternate paths are taken by the network in response to congestion, the extra
cost due to the congestion should not necessarily fall only on those flows
that have been redirected. (Shenker et al., 1996, p. 193)

5. Alternative Usage-based Pricing Schemes

47

Shenker et al's model, using the two approximations, is a specific example of a general
concept. Edge pricing in general only describes the point where the charges are
calculated, not how they are calculated. Providers are free to choose a pricing scheme,
or mixture of schemes within their network. This could be usage-based, flat-rate or
capacity-based charging. This gives rise to the main advantage of Edge Pricing,
described in the first point below.

Advantages:
•

The pricing policy is not built into the network architecture. This gives freedom to
individual providers to be more innovative in designing their own policies, allowing
a natural evolution or a 'natural selection' to occur with pricing policies, leading to
the development of the best scheme for a particular network.

•

Prices are more predictable than in responsive pricing schemes. This would be a
positive factor to subscribers as it takes some of the uncertainty out of budgeting
network costs (this applies to Shenker et al's model described above).

•

Complexity is moved to the edges of the network away from the performance
sensitive core.

Some of the disadvantages result mainly from unresolved issues m Shenker et al's
proposal.

Disadvantages:
•

It does not adjust prices to instantaneous fluctuations in congestion and so does not
have the ability to make adjustments to bursts of traffic.

•

There would be overheads in monitoring congestion to keep the approximation of
expected congestion conditions at the time of day correct.

•

Similarly, the expected path would have to be monitored to update it in accordance
with network changes.

5. Alternative Usage-based Pricing Schemes

•

48

In the case of the receiver paying, they mention the receiver can indicate a
willingness to pay but not how a maximum limit can be put on how much they are
willing to pay.

•

It is undefined what will happen if a user has reached the maximum they are willing
to pay and refuses to accept more packets. In this case, how do you treat packets
already transported, possibly across several networks?

•

There is no explanation of how the receiver and sender could share the cost of
transfer.

•

There is also the issue of charging in multicasting. (described above in 4.2 What
About Multicasting?)

•

Trying to resolve the issues mentioned in the previous points could lead to
overwhelming complexity.

•

Although individual network providers are free to choose their own pricing policy,
Edge Pricing does require all networks to participate in the general concept to allow
the necessary cost shifting between networks.

The proposal for edge pricing is a preliminary one and Shenker et al. acknowledge these
unresolved issues. However, Edge Pricing is mainly given by Shenker et al. as an
alternative to extemality pricing schemes with the idea to "initiate a dialog about such
pricing schemes and hopefully stimulate the creation of other pricing paradigms"
(Shenker et al., 1996, p. 200)
Another scheme, similar to Edge Pricing, is the Metro Card scheme which is proposed
by Fang (1996) and described in the following section.

5.4 Metro Card
As described in Shenker et al's (1996) version of Edge Pricing, the Metro Card performs
its accounting at the borders of a network. The difference here though, is that each
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network has to participate in the same scheme to facilitate the accounting. The basic
idea is that a packet will accrue tolls as it crosses border routers of a network. These
tolls will accumulate on the packet's journey to its destination. On arrival a notification
is then sent back to the originator, in the form of a bill packet that contains the value of
tolls accumulated on the total journey. The tolls are dynamically adjusted to reflect the
congestion and delay on a particular route. Various routes will be available for a packet
to take, the route chosen will depend on the toll willing to be paid for the packet, the
service level required and the congestion currently existing on those routes.

In the case of packets crossing two different networks, represented by ISP l and ISP2,
before reaching its destination, ISP2 would charge the tolls to ISP l. ISP2 does not have
to know who originated the packet. ISP l would then recoup this cost by charging the
originator of the packet. The similarity to Edge Pricing is that costs are resolved only
between bordering networks.

There are three components to the Metro Card system
1. An accounting field in the IP header: This contains four elements - Service_Level,
Accu_Tolls, Budget and Max_Charge.
•

Service_Level indicates the level of service the packet desires.

•

Accu_Tolls is the accumulated tolls incurred within a particular network. This
field is subtracted from the budget and then set to zero whenever the packet
enters a new network.

•

Budget shows how much value remains. As the packet travels this is
decremented by the tolls accumulated.

•

Max_Charge is the maximum the packet is willing to pay for its travel. This is
not changed during travel and the Budget is initially set to Max_Charge.

2. The tolls: Tolls are calculated and stored by the routers. There are different tolls for
different routes and a packet will have various routes it can take to a destination.
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The tolls are dynamically adjusted to reflect the congestion existing on the routes.
Routing tables will have to be enlarged to accommodate multiple routes for a
particular destination and the delay existing on that route. The Service_Level is used
here to match the best possible route to the level of service desired.
3. Accounting: Accounting tables are maintained in the border routers. These tables are
used to record the tolls incurred by a packet within the network. This information
can then be used to bill bordering networks for traffic. Included here are the bill
packets, which complete the accounting cycle by sending the total cost of sending
the packet back to the originator. These bill packets are treated by routers as a
special case and do not incur tolls.

Advantages:

•

This is a responsive pricing scheme that adjusts dynamically to congestion and so
would provide benefits to resource usage balancing.

•

The issue of who pays (receiver, sender or cost sharing) is not built into the scheme
and so is left in the hands of the users or user applications. Fang (1996, p. 107)
citing the advantage as being that the participants in a transmission have better
knowledge of who is the beneficiary.

•

It allows an explicit statement of the desired QoS to be indicated.

This proposal suffers from many of the problems of other schemes mentioned in this
document.

Disadvantages:

•

There would be the same difficulties as the Smart Market with calculating the costs
of congestion. Therefore, there would be problems in setting optimal tolls and
service levels.

•

It is uncertain what would happen if a packet does not have enough budget to reach
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its destination. This is similar to the problems of the Smart Market mentioned by
Parenteau and Rishe (1997, p. 94).
•

There is unpredictability in the charges. Setting the budget high does not provide a
guarantee that the packets will arrive, or receive a certain level of QoS. This is
because the accumulated charges are dependent on the congestion encountered and
the level of congestion is unknown at the point of sending a packet.

•

It has the drawback of all schemes in that the accounting of individual packets my
cause large overheads and be difficult and expensive to implement.

•

The implementation of this scheme requires changes to the IP protocol and IP
header, which is a barrier to its introduction.

•

Similarly significant changes are required in routing software.

•

The Metro Card assumes a homogeneous network. For example, bill packets have to
be treated in the same way by all intervening networks. What would happen if an
intervening network had a policy of charging for all packets, regardless of type?

•

It remains undefined as to what would happen if bill packets were lost. This
introduces a point of weakness to the whole system.

The Metro Card, as do the other schemes mentioned, suffer because of the complexities
they may introduce as well as the fact that they also may destroy the simplicity of the
current service of the Internet that has proven so successful to date. A scheme that side
steps this complexity and also maintains a form similar to the current Internet is the
Paris Metro Pricing scheme.

5.5 Paris Metro Pricing
Odlyzko ( 1997) presents an idea inspired by the Paris Metro rail system that is still used
successfully today in some regions.

1

st

and

2

nd

class rail cars are provided that are

identical in number and quality of seats. The only difference being that
cost twice as much. This leads to the obvious result that

1
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1
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class tickets

class cars are less crowded
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than

nd

2

class cars. People choosing

1

st

class do so on the basis that they can sit down,

and only the people willing to pay for this privilege do so. This is a self regulating
system in that if

1

st

extra and move to

class become too crowded, people will be less willing to pay the
nd

2

class, so reducing the congestion in

1

st

class and restoring its

quality of service.

Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) is a simple pricing scheme to control congestion on
networks. The main network would be partitioned into several logically separated
channels. Each channel would have a fixed portion of the capacity of the entire network.
The channels would operate in the same best effort manner of the present Internet with
all packets on a particular channel treated equally. The only difference between the
channels would be price. The idea being that the higher priced channel would be less
congested and so offer a higher QoS (see Figure 7). Odlyzko ( 1 997, p. 5) argues that the
QoS offered by a lightly loaded best effort service would be satisfactory for most needs.
This being demonstrated by the acceptable performance of the present day Internet at
uncongested times, such as in the early morning. Schnizlein ( 1 998, p. 52) also holds this
veiw, saying that the service on the Internet is quite good, only being degraded when it
is under load.
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This scheme could be implemented using 1Pv4. The currently unused 3-bit priority field
could be used to indicate the channel. Changes would have to be made to router
software to maintain logically separate queues or to give appropriate priority to packets
belonging to different channels. The major change would be the necessary introduction
of hardware or software to count the packets for each user. This, as in all usage
sensitive pricing schemes, is a complicating factor. A mitigating aspect of PMP though,
is that this accounting could be done at the edge of the network, rather than in the
performance sensitive core. The accounting could also be simplified using sampling to
reduce the overhead of counting every single packet.

Advantages:

•

It is simple, there is none of the complexity of things like the bidding procedures of
the Smart Market, and the need to dynamically calculate congestion costs. The
pricing is constant and easily understood. (Optimally, the charges for the channels
should remain fairly constant to maintain some predictability and allow the self
regulation of congestion to take effect as described in the example of the Paris train
system).

•

It can be implemented using the current Internet protocols. This would reduce the
impact of introducing the new system and it could be implemented without having
to wait for the implementation of something like 1Pv6.

•

The general consumer preference for flat-pricing can be accommodated by selling
large blocks of transmission capacity. For example, selling 1 00Mb a week on a low
quality channel, or 60Mb on a higher quality channel. This is also preferable for
service providers as it allows for a more predictable income.

•

Reduces traffic management tasks by inducing users to separate themselves into
classes. In this way congestion control is achieved virtually for free as far as the
network is concerned, the users manage themselves.

•

The lowest QoS channel can be left as a free service, to users this will appear the
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same as the current Internet and will ease the transition to usage-based pricing.

Disadvantages:

•

With best effort service there would be occasional service degradations, even on the
higher QoS channels. "For PMP to work, the performance of the different networks
has to be predictable, at least on average. Unfortunately the fractal nature of data
traffic means that we have to expect that all PMP channels will experience sporadic
congestion." (Odlyzko, 1 997, p. 8)

•

The service degradation could upset the whole system. For example, if the lowest
channel is congested for a long time, delays would cause users to move to a higher
priced channel. The higher priced channel would then become congested, degrading
its QoS. Odlyzko ( 1997, p. 8) suggests that providing a high price barrier between
channels would discourage users switching too readily to a higher QoS channel. He
suggests this could be done by only selling the capacity to send large blocks of
packets, rather than single packets.

•

To maintain a high level of QoS on the premium channels the load would have to be
low. It is difficult to ascertain whether the capacity utilisation would be so low as to
make it unprofitable (Odlyzko, 1 997, p. 6)

•

It is difficult to set the prices and capacities of the separate networks. Odlyzko
( 1 997, p. 8) says that these could be set by taking note of customer surveys and
customer complaints. Also, time of day variations in traffic patterns could be used to
adjust prices and capacities to reach an optimal balance.

•

PMP has the same disadvantage of other schemes, that is the accounting overhead.

The problems involved in tracking usage on a packet level and resolving ownership
of those packets down to a user level could be overwhelming.

PMP is not designed to be an optimal solution to pricing on the Internet. It is put

forward as a simple alternative that would provide some form of congestion control as
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well as a form of differential service quality, while at the same time maintaining some
of the characteristics of the current Internet. There are researchers, however, who are
investigating 'optimal' pricing schemes that provide a more accurate and dynamic
pricing mechanism that is very sensitive to changes in congestion and provides truly
differential QoS. One such scheme is Priority Classes, proposed by (Gupta et al., 1996).

5.6 Priority Classes
Gupta et al. (1996) propose a pricing scheme they call Priority Classes. They define a
network as a series of interconnected servers and clients. The servers provide various
services and the clients make demands on those services in the form of service requests.
The demands on each of the servers are made through a priority queue system that is
attached to each of the servers. These queues provide the various priority classes. A
price and expected waiting time are associated with each priority class at each server. A
client can use the expected waiting time and price to select a priority class and server
that will minimise costs and provide a desired level of service.

The process of selection of a server and priority class is:
Upon the arrival of a service request, the type of service required is
identified (a service is characterized by the amount of computational cycles
required at a server). Then, the current estimates of prices and predicted
waiting times are obtained for all the servers offering the particular service.
The user then evaluates the total expected cost of this service in terms of her
delay cost and the service cost against her value of the service. If the total
cost of the service is higher than her value for the service, the user quits the
system; otherwise, she submits the request for obtaining the service. (Gupta
et al., 1995b, p. 8)

The user (or a software tool such as a 'Smart Agent' working on behalf of the user) can
select the QoS based on how much they value the service. This is of benefit to the users
as they can request services based on their valuation of that service. Additionally, it
discourages misuse by providing incentives for the appropriate selection of QoS. Load
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is also distributed to less congested nodes through the process of selecting the server
that offers the best service for the price. The benefits to the network service providers
are that they can monitor the loads at different servers and set prices according to the
load imposed by those servers on the backbone. Furthermore, the demand experienced
by the different service classes at a server can give indicators as to whether a particular
service is really needed, or if expansion is necessary.

The prices are calculated and adjusted dynamically at each node for each priority class.
The dynamic computation of the prices is carried out using "approximations of
performance parameters estimated based on short-term historical data collected at
individual network nodes" (Gupta et al., 1 999, p. 59). This provides a pricing policy that
is sensitive to instantaneous fluctuations in demand, and so is an attempt at an 'optimal'
pricing scheme that directly relates a users impact on the network to prices.

They derive formula for 'optimal prices' by priority class that "maximize total welfare of
all users" (Gupta et al., 1 996, p. 73). (Evidence of the optimality and benefits was
shown in a simulation, the results of which are shown in Figure 3). The formula adjust
prices so as "to optimise the trade-off between greater throughput volume and longer
waiting times" and so that "aggregated user demands don't exceed optimal levels and
waiting-time expectations are correct" (Gupta et al., 1 996, p. 73).

The optimal prices depend on the traffic flow at the site, the size of the packets, the
priority class, and the social cost of time. Shenker et al. ( 1 996) express doubts about
calculating the latter, the social cost of time, pointing out that knowing the utility loss as
a result of service degradation due to delay is fundamentally unknowable. In addition:
the problem of denial of service leading to some delay, rather than an eternal
denial of service, makes the valuations of the flows not directly related to
congestion costs. Consequently, determining optimality in the presence of
fluctuating demand is extremely difficult. (Shenker et al., 1 996, p. 7).

57

5. Alternative Usage-based Pricing Schemes

However, Gupta et al. (1999, p. 61) claim to have shown that "reasonable estimates of
users' delay based utility loss can be computed by a Baysian computational approach
based on current prices and observable user actions". In this way Gupta et al. reduce the
difficulties of determining optimality by using "reasonable estimates" to arrive at
"approximations of 'optimal' prices" (Gupta et al., 1999, p. 60)

(A Baysian approach is a form of inference mechanism. It includes the fact that we have
some knowledge about a process being investigated before obtaining the data in the
inferencing process. This prior knowledge has some influence on the conclusions drawn
from that data. Inferencing should therefore be based on the prior knowledge as well as
the data. Baysian inference is the mechanism for drawing inference from this combined
knowledge (Coles, 1999).)
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Figure 8: Prices with changing exogenous demand (Gupta et al., 1999, p. 60)

Gupta et al. (1999) demonstrated, by means of simulation, that their dynamic pricing
mechanism responds well to fluctuations in demand. Figure 8 displays the results. It
shows the demand pattern for a day covering times when the network is both under
utilised and over-utilised. The price fluctuations are superimposed on this. The left y
axis represents the prices, the right y-axis represents arrival rates of demands and the x
axis the time in seconds.
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It can be seen that prices adjust quickly as the demand changes, with the price being
almost zero when the network is uncongested and significantly higher when the network
is very congested. This adaptation is automatic and does not require any prior
knowledge of the demand characteristics of users. This is because the adaptation is
based on "observable system performance" (Gupta et al., 1 999, p. 60). The same
behaviour was also displayed during periods of what they call 'fractal demand', which
represents bursts of traffic, with the prices keeping pace with the rapidly changing
demand caused by the bursts.

Accounting and Billing

Gupta, Stahl, & Whinston ( 1995a, p. 1 2) suggest that accounting and billing could be
carried out in two ways. First, each server could meter charges at its location and
periodically send a bill to the client machine which processes the charges to produce a
monthly bill. Second, a service request could include a bill portion so that when a
service request is made the server records the charges and when the request returns to
the client, it contains a complete bill.

The user would not receive a bill from each node and link of the network, but would
rather receive one bill from their access provider for their use of a server. The access
provider would be charged for its connection to the next link in an identical manner to
Edge Pricing, with cost shifting occurring between intervening networks as described
above. It would be the responsibility of the first access provider in the chain to recover
the total cost to itself from the user who originated the service request.

Advantages:

•

Prices are directly related to congestion and so encourage spreading network usage
over time and to less congested nodes.

•

Dynamic price adjustment takes into account fluctuating demand and so prices
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reflect the 'true' cost to the network.
•

Because price adjustment is dynamic and based on demand, there is no need to
continuously monitor changing demand patterns to update prices.

•

Approximations are used that simplify the calculation of 'optimal' prices.

•

It offers various priorities in the form of 'Priority Classes'. This allows users to select
different levels of QoS based on the application and the subjective valuation of the
service.

•

Computation of prices is decentralised and requires no network-wide information to
compute prices at a particular node.

•

It takes advantage of the processing power of individual nodes, spreading the work
and thus the overheads of computation.

•

The profitability of each server can be used to guide investment decisions for
expansion.

Disadvantages:
•

It could lead to starvation for low priority classes. This is expressed by Odlyzko
( 1 997, p. 1 5): "low priority classes could fail to get any bandwidth at all if enough
traffic from higher priority classes show up".

•

Although computation of prices is distributed the scheme does have substantial
overhead. It requires "collecting and processing extensive information about the
network" (Odlyzko, 1997, p. 1 5).

•

The issues of resolving who pays and how this is indicated would introduce further
overheads.

•

As in other schemes, traffic accounting would introduce significant overheads.

•

Individual nodes on the networks would have to 'know' about the price adjusting
computations and the priority classes, so this scheme requires a uniform deployment
across the whole network.

•

The process of searching for a server with acceptable prices and waiting times for a
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particular service class, then presenting the user with a choice, introduces delays and
overheads. These delays could be significant if the number of servers offering the
desired service is large. (However, this could be alleviated using 'Smart Agents'.)
•

The development and deployment of the software to implement the scheme,
(including the software to perform the tasks mentioned in the previous point) would
be costly and have a large impact on the current Internet.

These disadvantages have to be balanced against the evidence of Gupta et al's.
simulations (see Figure 3) which show large benefits of adopting their usage-based
scheme. For example, if it is accepted that this scheme contributes to the general welfare
then it could be assumed that low priority classes are included in these benefits. The low
priority classes, then, may not experience starvation. Additionally, as expressed by
Brownlee ( 1 994, p. 6) in the NZ experience, the overheads of the system may be well
worth it, considering the benefits gained.

The following section explores the relationship between the overheads involved in the
various pricing schemes and the 'optimality' of the pricing schemes.

5.7 Comparison of Pricing Schemes
This section provides a comparison between the pricing schemes based on two
veiwpoints:

1. Optimality: the concept of an optimal pricing scheme as proposed by Gupta et al.
( 1 999).

2. Implementation issues: such as the impact made on the network, the overheads
involved and the impact on users.
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5.7.1 Optimality
Gupta et al. (1999, p. 59) propose a set of characteristics that a desirable (optimal)
pricing mechanism should possess:

1. Prices should encourage users to use the network when it is less congested by
shifting their demands across time.
2. Prices should take into account the impact of current load on future demand.
3. Pricing should preferably be coarser than packet level pricing so that is easier and
less costly to implement.
4. Prices should reflect the load status of the network nodes (routers, gateways).
5. Prices should yield effective load management by redistributing the load from
highly loaded nodes to lightly loaded nodes.
6. The pricing scheme should be implemented in a completely decentralised manner,
for example, by requiring performance information at an individual node to set
prices at that node but not requiring any system-wide information. Otherwise, the
overhead costs involved in computing the prices may negate any potential benefits
of the pricing method.
7. There should be multiple priorities in order to take into account the different QoS
required by different applications and users.
8. Prices should encourage the appropriate use of different levels of QoS.
9. The pricing scheme should be implemented in such a way that service providers
have incentives to provide the required QoS based on the profits they derive from
pricing methods.

Pricing mechanisms with these characteristics would promote efficient resource usage
by spreading load on the network across different nodes as well as time. They would
also provide different levels of QoS that are directly linked to prices and the user's
valuation of a service. The prices would encourage appropriate use of QoS and give

5 . Alternative Usage-based Pricing Schemes

62

incentives to service providers to invest in expansion. Points 3 and 6 include the
characteristics that a pricing mechanism should be computationally viable.

Table 1 (see Appendix) provides a comparison of the various pricing proposals
discussed based on Gupta et al's. proposed characteristics of a desirable pricing
mechanism. Gupta et al's. 'Priority Classes' scheme is revealed as the most optimal
using these characteristics. The 'Smart Market' and the 'Metro Card' schemes are also
shown as being highly optimal, only lacking in that they require accounting on a packet
level. Next lowest on optimality are 'Edge Pricing' and the 'Paris Metro Pricing'
schemes. This is also not surprising as these were designed to achieve approximations to
optimality in order to overcome the difficulties in designing a truly optimal scheme.
Volume pricing and flat-rate pricing come last, with volume pricing providing more
benefits that flat-rate pricing.

5.7.2 Implementation issues
Table 2 (see Appendix) shows a comparison of the pricing schemes based on other
issues. It was chosen to call these 'implementation issues' as they may affect the
implementation of a pricing scheme both from the user's point of view and from aspect
that they may introduce complexities into the Internet. Categories 1 to 3 reflect the
impact on users and categories 4 to 1 1 the technical implications to the network of
implementing a pricing scheme. These comparisons are included to balance the
conclusions that may be drawn from assessing a pricing scheme purely on whether it
displays the desirable characteristics of an optimal scheme. As will be shown, the most
optimal pricing schemes actually have the greatest disadvantages from an
implementation point of view.

The categories used to describe 'implementation issues' are:
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1 . Perverse effects: effects such as caused by flat-rate pricing where a congested

network can actually encourage network use.
2. Fairness of prices: whether prices are related to the social cost of network use, that
is, whether prices reflect the degradation to service of other users caused by a user's
service request being carried out.
3. Predictable cost: can users predict how much their network usage will cost them. It
was shown that part of the reason users prefer flat-rates is that the costs are
predictable, so this may be an important factor.
4. Correct prices easily arrived at: whether the parameters used to calculate the
prices are actually knowable or accessible, and whether the calculation of those
prices involve large overheads.
5. Built into the architecture: building the pricing mechanism into the architecture
may be difficult due to the lack of central control. It also would not be as flexible as
a mechanism that was independent of the network.
6. Can indicate who pays: as discussed earlier, this would introduce many
complexities, and so a pricing scheme that has solved these issues would be at a
great advantage.
7. Simple: many of the pricing proposals would introduce further complexity to the
Internet and destroy many of the advantages of the present system. A complex
pricing scheme would also be difficult and expensive to implement.
8. Implementation overheads: this is related to the point above and includes things
like development of new software and protocols.
9. Management overheads: this could include monitoring of shifts in time of day
usage patterns, adjusting prices and setting priority levels for different service
classes.
10. Assumes Internet homogeneous: the Internet is heterogeneous and any scheme

that relies on a uniform deployment over the Internet to function may have barriers
to its introduction.
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1 1. Changes to protocols/routers needed: a pricing scheme that requires changes to
existing Internet infrastructure or protocols may experience barriers to its
introduction. This would also be a further overhead in deployment of a pricing
scheme.

5.7.3 Optimality vs Implementation

In order to provide a comparison between the results shown in Table 1 and those shown
in Table 2 a numerical value was associated to a result based on whether it represented
an advantage or a disadvantage. A graph (Figure 9) was then produced from the totals
for each pricing scheme using these values. Values were attributed in the following
way:

Table 1
•

All categories - No = 0, Yes = 1 , partial advantages = 0.5.

Table 2
•

Categories 1 , 5, 10, 1 1 - No = 1 , Yes = 0, partial advantages = 0.5.

•

Categories 2, 3, 4, 7 - No = 0, Yes = 1 , partial advantages = 0.5.

•

Categories 8, 9 - Low = 1.5, Moderate = 1, High = 0.

•

Category 6 - Not included as none of the schemes really addresses this issue.

This is a crude estimate of the advantages. However, it serves the purpose of illustrating
the trade-off between implementablity and achieving optimality.

The results in Figure 9 show that the more optimal pricing schemes, Smart Market,
Metro Card and Priority Classes, have the least advantages concerning implementation.
This mainly stems from the complexity, implementation overheads and management
overheads they may introduce to the Internet.
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The least optimal schemes, Flat-rate and Volume pricing show the greatest advantages
concerning implementation. However, this must be balanced against the negative affects
already described of having a pricing scheme that is far from optimal from the
perspective of resource management.
Cllmplementation advantages
• o plimality
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Figure 9: Comparison of Pricing Schemes

The pricing schemes that show more of a balance between optimality and
implementability are Edge Pricing and Paris Metro Pricing. This result is a reflection of
the acknowledgement by the designers of the problems of achieving true optimality in a
pricing scheme. In Edge Pricing, Shenker et al. (1996) uses the approximations of
expected congestion conditions at a time of day along an expected path to eliminate
some of the difficulties. In Paris Metro Pricing, Odlyzko (1997) retains some of the
benefits of the current Internet by the use of differently priced channels, avoiding the
need for complex price calculations.

These results underline the fact that these pricing schemes are proposals (except for
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Flat-rate and Volume pricing) and require more research and experimentation before
being implemented. The research so far on optimal pricing has involved the use of
simulations. This has shown many benefits of adopting an optimal pricing scheme such
as Priority Classes. However, further research could be done in the form of a real-life
trial, similar to the INDEX experiments, using an optimal pricing scheme. This may test
the implementability of the pricing scheme and also provide some empirical evidence of
the benefits.
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6. CONCLUSION / SUMMARY
The Internet is growing rapidly and the demands being made on transmission capacity
are increasing in volume and sophistication. This is leading to a situation where the
current best-effort service and flat-rate pricing on the Internet may no longer provide the
service desired by users.

Flat-rate pricing can give rise to 'perverse' effects that can cause increased use of the
network in times of congestion and disincentives to invest in capacity expansion. This,
combined with the fact that incremental usage of bandwidth is not charged for may lead
to a 'tragedy of the commons' where the value of the Internet for both service providers
and users is reduced.

The best-effort service of the Internet may not provide sufficient guarantees of QoS for
delay sensitive applications such as real-time video and audio. However, it may be less
than optimal to link QoS directly to the application, as different users value their
network traffic differently at different times. Pricing can be used as a tool in the
provision of differential QoS. The price a user is willing to pay can indicate the value
the user places on a service and so the level of QoS they desire for that service. This can
encourage the appropriate use of QoS and also provide indicators to service providers
for capacity expansion.

There are various ways of providing differential QoS, such as ATM and RSVP.
However, they have limited value in the case of HTTP traffic, which makes up the
majority of traffic on the Internet. The possibly imminent introduction of 1Pv6 with its
ability to specify QoS may mean that some form of usage-based pricing be implemented
to control appropriate use of QoS.

The arguments for the introduction of usage-based pricing and differential QoS are not
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clear cut, however. There are arguments that differential QoS may not be needed due to
advances and falling costs in the provision of bandwidth. Additionally, the introduction
of differential QoS and a usage-based pricing scheme would probably be a source of
complexity and overheads. It may be better to avoid this and invest in increasing
available bandwidth to keep the Internet simple. On the other hand, there are arguments
that any gains in bandwidth may be quickly negated by new, more demanding
applications and that the 'tragedy of the commons will make differential QoS and usage
based pricing a necessity. Adding to the uncertainty there is also contention about the
presence of congestion on the Internet and the real cause of delays. Another factor is
that users have a preference for flat-rate pricing and so may resist the introduction of a
usage-based scheme.

There are various proposals for usage-based pricing schemes, some of which were
discussed in this document. Other examples include Token Bucket (Schnizlein, 1998),
Multiple Priority Queues (Parenteau & Rishe, 1997), Allocated Capacity Framework
(Clark & Fang, 1998) and the use of the IP precedence field (Braun, Claffy, & Polyzos,
1 993). Of the proposed schemes discussed, there seems to be a trade-off between
optimality and implementability, with the most optimal scheme (Priority Classes) being
the least implementable. The two schemes that take the difficulties of achieving
optimality into account (Edge Pricing and PMP) seem to display more of a balance
between optimality and implementability.

The problem of whether the receiver, sender or a combination of both pay and how to
indicate this is unresolved in many of the proposed schemes. It can be seen as a negative
aspect and potential source for added complexity in the implementation of usage-based
pricing. This problem is exacerbated in the context of multicasting.

Further research could be carried out in the area of indicating who pays (receiver,
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sender or a combination). This could involve some guidelines for deciding who should
be responsible for paying as well as the mechanics of indicating who pays. An area for
particular attention could be in resolving the issues surrounding who pays in
multicasting. Another area for research could be in providing empirical evidence of the
benefits of usage-based pricing using one of the proposed schemes in a real-life
experiment similar to INDEX.
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8. Appendix

8. APPENDIX

Table 1: Comparison of pricing schemes based on characteristics of 'optimal' pricing policies.
Volume

Smart
Market

Edge Pricing

Metro Card

Paris Metro

Priority
Classes

On a coarse
basis if time of
day discounts
offered

Yes

Only on a
coarse time or
day basis

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

4. Reflect load status

No

No, not
dynamically

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

5. Provide load

No

No

Yes

Yes

User's
responsibility

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Pricing Scheme

Flat-rate

1 . Encourage use at

less congested times No

2. Include impact of
current load on
future demand
3. Coarser than packet
level

management
6. Decentralised
7. Multiple priorities

8. Encourage
appropriate use of
QoS
9. Incentives to
service providers

No (not
dynamically)
User's
responsibility
Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes, limited
to number of
channels.

No

No differential
QoS

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

.

. issues.
Table 2 Compar1son of pr1cmg schemes based on impIementa tion
Pricin2 Scheme
Flat-rate
Smart Market
Volume
Edge Pricing
1 . Perverse Effects

Yes

Yes, probably not
marked

2. Fairness of prices

No, Unfair to
light users

Yes, fairer than
Flat-rates

3. Predictable cost

Yes

Yes, can use bulk
selling of volume

4. Correct prices
easily arrived at

Yes, simply an
access fee

5. Built into
architecture

No

6. Can indicate who
pays

Subscriber pays
for access

7 . Simple

Yes

Traffic identified
on whether sent or Unresolved
received.
Yes
No

Low

Moderate

Low

10. Assumes Internet
homogeneous
1 1 . Changes to
protocols/routers
needed

8. Implementation
overheads
9. Management
overheads

Metro Card

Paris Metro
Some instability
caused by selfregulation
Yes, users pay for
the channel they
need at the time

Priority Classes

No

No

No

Yes, directly
based on
congestion caused
No, however, the
upper limit is
known.

Yes, however
they are based on
approximations

Yes, directly
related to
congestion
No, however, the
maximum budget
is known

Yes

No

Yes, moderately

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Unresolved

No

User pays for
access

Yes

No

Yes

No, the user pays
for services
received
No

High

Moderate

High

Moderate

High

High

High

Moderate

High

Moderate

High

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Can use 1Pv4 , but
changes to routers
needed

Yes

Yes

Yes

No
Yes
Yes, Can accept
or reject cost of
current session
Automatically
calculates correct
prices
Yes

